The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have speci…c rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a social network to be stable if no group is modi…ed any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players'preferences under which stable social networks are induced for sure. Furthermore, by embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply our model to job markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees and, therefore, have in ‡uence on the stability of the job market.
Introduction
There are various situations in economic or daily life where individuals organize themselves in groups, whether for cooperation, coordination, or otherwise. The goal of this paper is to formalize and examine environments where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted as social networks in this study.
Depending on the context, formation of these networks occurs for manifold reasons and considering all of them seems to be a virtually impossible venture. In order to be as general as possible, we abstract from activities carried out within each group. That is, we suppose the individuals'preferences to directly depend on the structure of the network. Given these preferences, there might be incentives for joining or leaving certain groups. The salient point is, however, that individuals are not necessarily free to deviate. Some members of a group might have certain property rights which allow them to block the arrival of new members or even give them the power to force existing members to stay. We capture this aspect by introducing the notion of constitution. Each group is supposed to have speci…c rules governing both which deviations are feasible and who may decide about the deviations. Therefore, the formation of social networks not only depends on the preferences of the individuals but also on the property rights granted by the constitutions.
The framework outlined above captures a wide spectrum of possible applications. A particular one that we are going to discuss in detail is job markets with labor unions. But one could also mention research collaborations, immigration, or social clubs, for instance. These examples already indicate that the rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave a group may vary greatly. For instance, in some groups it might be possible to dismiss members but in others there might be a protection against this. Or, in some groups entry might be free but in others it might require the consent of other members. Therefore, the constitutional design may have a signi…cant impact on the formation of social networks. Consequently, we are interested in addressing the following questions: What happens in terms of stability if more blocking power is given to the individuals? Under which circumstances is it possible to …nd constitutions which guarantee the stability of social networks?
The formation of social groups is of fundamental interest and it has been examined from numerous angles. For instance, Ellickson et al. (1999 Ellickson et al. ( , 2001 ) as well as Allouch and Wooders (2008) analyze this issue in the context of general equilibrium theory, Acemoglu et al. (2012) provide a dynamic model for studying the stability of societies, and Page and Wooders (2010) formalize club formation as a non-cooperative game, to name but a few. In fact, providing a complete overview over all publications dealing with group formation in a broader sense would exceed the scope of nearly every paper due to the great complexity and diversi…cation of the …eld. Therefore, the following survey restricts on most closely related branches and outlines which publications particularly in ‡uenced our work.
Analyzing group formation but abstracting from activities carried out within each group obviously relates to hedonic coalition formation (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2001 ; Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002) . Moreover, studies dealing with economic networks (e.g., Jackson, 2008) or with matching markets (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) can also be embedded into our setting. Thus, we contribute indirectly to a stream of literature where the authors combine coalition formation and matching problems (e.g., Cesco, 2012; Pycia, 2012) . However, the way we model social networks and preferences is closer to models from matching theory where individuals are not only concerned about which groups they belong to but also about who the other members of the groups are (e.g., Dutta and Masso, 1997; Echenique and Yenmez, 2007; Kominers, 2010) .
One of the main contributions of this paper is to formalize constitutional rules within a hedonic setting. This approach is in spirit with some other publications from literature, like Bala and Goyal (2000) , Page and Wooders (2009) , or Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001) , for example. These papers analyze which networks or coalition structures might be expected to emerge under several speci…c rules governing network or coalition formation, respectively. However, the aforementioned works di¤er from ours in at least one important aspect. For analyzing which social networks are likely to occur we focus on constitutionally stable networks. A social network is considered to be constitutionally stable if no group of players is modi…ed any more. The salient point is that, in our framework, the stability of a network depends on explicitly modeled constitutions. In the above-mentioned papers, on the contrary, the constitutional rules are varied only implicitly by discussing di¤erent stability concepts. For this reason, our approach not only achieves greater generality but it also allows separating more clearly which in ‡uence constitutional rules have on group formation.
The analysis conducted in this paper is twofold. On the one hand, we focus on the question whether constitutionally stable networks actually exist and, on the other, we discuss whether they might be reached given that the players apply a "trial-anderror strategy". To this end, we follow Roth and Vande Vate (1990) . In the context of marriage problems (or two-sided one-to-one matchings), the authors introduced a Markov process which always results in a stable matching with probability one, even if the individuals act myopically. Later, this work has been extended and varied in several ways (e.g., Chung, 2000; Diamantoudi et al., 2004; Klaus et al., 2010 ; Kojima and Unver, 2008) . In our study, we use basically the same approach but we adopt the terminology of Jackson and Watts (2001, 2002) who examined a similar random process but focused on stochastic stability of economic networks. By means of the notion of improving paths, we formulate requirements on constitutions and preferences guaranteeing that from every social network there always exists an improving path leading to a stable network. It turns out, in fact, that this is equivalent to requiring the existence of a speci…c version of a common ranking (cf. Banerjee et al., 2001; Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988) . We also …nd that giving more blocking power to the individuals does not necessarily lead to more stability. Indeed, higher blocking power might destroy the existence of the common ranking.
Although the main purpose of this paper is to discuss the formation of social networks in general, the last part is devoted to a particular application, namely to job markets with labor unions. Applying the general results obtained in the sections before allows us to judge, for di¤erent levels of unions' strength, whether the job market is likely to become stable or not. In doing so we also …nd a variation of Roth's "polarization of interests"(cf. Roth, 1984) between employers and employees.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the formal de…nitions of social networks and constitutions. In Section 3, we discuss conditions for the existence of strongly stable networks. In Section 4, we apply the corresponding results to our model of job markets. Finally, Section 5 contains the conclusions.
The Model
Let N = fi 1 ; : : : ; i n g be a …nite set of players and let M = fc 1 ; : : : ; c m g be a …nite set of connections.
De…nition 1.
A social network h is a mapping h : M ! 2 N assigning to each c 2 M a subset of players.
1
A social network h indicates which players are members of which connections. For each i 2 N let M h (i) = fc 2 M j i 2 h(c)g be the set of connections player i is a member of. The set of all social networks is denoted by H, and the cardinality of H is jHj = 2 mn . A particular special case is the empty social network h ; 2 H, with h ; (c) = ; for all c 2 M . That is, no player is contained in any connection.
Example 1. Suppose there are three players and four connections, i.e., N = fi 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 g and M = fc 1 ; c 2; c 3 ; c 4 g. Consider the case where all players are contained in c 1 , the players i 2 and i 3 are also contained in c 2 and c 3 , while c 4 only contains i 1 . This can be described formally by means of the following social network h (see also Figure 1 ): 
Constitutions
Each i 2 N is supposed to have rational preferences i over H. The tuple = ( i ) i2N is called a preference pro…le. Depending on the preferences, players might have incentives to alter some connection in a given network. For modeling formally how a connection can be modi…ed we use the symmetric di¤erence de…ned by 
If D \ h(c) = ;, we just write h + (c; D) instead of h (c; D) to stress the fact that no player leaves the connection. If D h(c), we just write h (c; D) instead of h (c; D) to indicate that no player joins the connection.
The central assumption in our model is that each connection could have di¤er-ent rules governing the exit of already existing members and/or the arrival of new members. That is, we introduce the notion of constitution in order to describe both the feasible modi…cations of a given connection and the coalitions whose support is needed for the modi…cations to take place. According to these constitutions, some deviations might be precluded, even if all deviating players would bene…t from altering the connection.
General Results
Generically constitutionally stable social networks might fail to exist and this leads to the question of how the design of constitutions a¤ects the (non-)existence of stable social networks. For approaching this issue, let us start with a straightforward and plausible attempt. Suppose the constitutions grant the players a certain level of blocking power. That is, the members of each connection might have certain property rights allowing them to inhibit modi…cations of the connection which are not conform to their own preferences. The remark follows directly from the de…nition of constitutional stability. If the sets of feasible deviations and supporting coalitions shrink, the blocking power of each individual player increases and the set of constitutionally stable networks might become larger. However, although the reasoning is very intuitive it might be misleading. In fact, whether more blocking power really implies more stability, strongly depends on the perspective of stability. On the one hand, there might be more stable networks but, on the other hand, reaching them might not be possible any more.
Let us formalize these ideas by adopting the notion of improving paths from Jackson and Watts (2001, 2002 ). An improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players join or leave some connection based on the improvement the resulting network o¤ers relative to the current network (see Jackson and Watts (2002) , p.51). Each network in the sequence di¤ers from the previous one in that one connection is modi…ed by a deviating coalition. This requires that every player joining the connection strictly prefers the resulting network to the current one. Moreover, the deviation should not be blocked and, hence, there should be a supporting coalition that strictly bene…ts from the deviation. De…nition 4. An improving path from h 0 2 H to h k 2 H is a sequence of networks (h 0 ; h 1 ; : : : ; h k ) such that for all 0 l < k there is exactly one c l 2 M with
If there exists an improving path from h 2 H to h 0 2 H, we write h 7 ! h 0 .
Moreover, let I(h) = fh 0 2 H j h 7 ! h 0 g be the set of networks that can be reached by an improving path starting at h. 4 Notice that h is constitutionally stable if and only if I(h) = ;. 4 Note that in improving paths the players are implicitly assumed to care only about the immediate bene…t of deviating to the next network but they do not forecast how others might react The non-existence of closed cycles not only implies existence of stable networks but it also guarantees stability in case the agents follow a "trial-and-error"strategy and care only about immediate bene…ts. In order to make this later point more speci…c consider the following random process which has been introduced for marriage problems by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) . Start with an arbitrary network h 0 2 H. Each round r 2 N 0 a pair (c r ; D r ) 2 M 2 N is drawn randomly with positive probability. If D r 2 A cr hr (C), the process moves to h r+1 := h r (c r ; D r ). Otherwise it remains at h r+1 := h r . Proposition 1. Let the society (N; M; ; C) be given. The random process described above always (i.e., for all h 0 2 H) converges with probability one to a constitutionally stable network if and only if there are no closed cycles.
In the context of one-to-one matching problems, the previous result has been established by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for one-to-one matching problems. Since to their actions. This approach relates to myopic learning (e.g., Kandori et al., 1993, Kandori and Rob, 1995; Monderer and Shapley, 1996) and is appropriate in relatively complex settings where it is di¢ cult to anticipate all possible changes. In the context of coalition or network formation some authors have relaxed this assumption by analyzing farsighted stability (see, e.g., Herings et al., 2009; Page and Wooders, 2009; Page et al., 2005) . Conducting similar studies in our framework is left for future work. 5 The authors have shown in slightly di¤erent terms that it is possible to …nd "pairwise-stable" networks if there exists no closed cycle.
the reasoning is the same, we omit the proof. But the intuition is straightforward. Since every feasible deviation is drawn with positive probability, also every improving path has a positive probability. Therefore, if for every starting point there is an improving path leading to a constitutionally stable network, the random process converges to one of these networks for sure whenever it is not stopped after …nitely many steps. This is particularly remarkable as in our model, network formation is not guided by a social planner or the like. Given the random process introduced above, non-existence of closed cycles is su¢ cient for guaranteeing that a society induces a constitutionally stable network with probability one even if the players act myopically and the deviations are not organized in a centralized way.
Proposition 2. Let N , M , and be given. Let C C. Then, non-existence of closed cycles under C does not imply that there are no closed cycles under C.
Proof. In order to proof the proposition, it is su¢ cient to construct a suitable example. The one we consider here is a variation of an example from Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) and Diamantoudi et al. (2004) . There are three players N = fi 1 :i 2 ; i 3 g and one connection M = fcg. Thus, jHj = 8. The networks are given by:
c fi 1 g fi 2 g fi 3 g fi 1 ; i 2 g fi 1 ; i 3 g fi 2 ; i 3 g fi 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 g ; and the players'preferences are
The setting is actually not completely the same as in Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) , because in their paper the authors study coalition formation (i.e., the set of players is always decomposed into a partition) while we have just one connection containing some of the players. However, "core stability"in their setting corresponds to constitutional stability with respect to the following constitutions C = (D; S):
for all h 6 = h ; . Given C, a priory all modi…cations of the connection are feasible and 
for all h 6 = h ; . Here, granting access to c just needs the support of only one member of the connection. This obviously implies C ( C and, thus, the players have less blocking power (but note that the sets of stable networks coincide). However, in this case, H does not form a closed cycle any more because for all h 2 H there is always one member of c who supports deviating from h to h 7 . Therefore, given C, there exists no closed cycle.
Proposition 2 dissents Remark 1 in a way. In fact, concluding that more blocking power leads to more stability is too simplistic. Even if the set of constitutionally stable networks becomes larger, it could happen that all improving paths leading to them are severed and closed cycles occur.
Consequently, instead of enhancing the blocking power of the players, it is necessary to …nd alternative approaches for guaranteeing that the society always induces a constitutionally stable network. To this end, consider once again the example constructed in the proof of Proposition 2. Examining it in detail yields that under C we have h 7 ! h 7 for all networks h 6 = h 7 but I(h 7 ) = ;. Therefore, for all h 2 H there exists a unique element in I(h) which is maximal with respect to "7 !". On the other hand, this is not true under C because H = fh 4 ; h 6 ; h 5 g forms a closed cycle and, thus, I(h) = H for all h 2 H. Although these observations are limited to this speci…c example, similar considerations also apply in general. A common ranking D re ‡ects a certain level of consensus between the players. The main idea is that the set of networks can be decomposed into several equivalence classes and once a higher class is reached, this will not be reversed afterwards. Indeed, a deviation takes place only if the joining and supporting players agree that the resulting network is not contained in a lower class than the current one. Note that a priory this is not a restriction at all because it would be possible, for instance, to choose D in such a way that all networks are equivalent (i.e., h D h 0 as well as h 0 D h for all h; h 0 2 H). This immediately implies that a (not necessarily unique) common ranking always exists. However, the more consensus about bene…cial deviations between the players, the stronger the restrictions that can be imposed by a common ranking.
Proposition 3. Let the society (N; M; ; C) be given.
(i) There are no cycles if and only if there exists a common ranking D such that for all H H there is a unique D-maximal networkĥ 2 H.
(ii) There are no closed cycles if and only if there exists a common ranking D such that for all h 2 H there is a unique D-maximal networkĥ 2 I(h).
For the proof refer to the appendix. The main importance of Proposition 3 is that it provides an alternative criterion for guaranteeing convergence to a constitutionally stable network. Item (i) states that requiring non-existence of cycles is equivalent to requiring the existence of a special common ranking which identi…es a unique maximal element in every subset of networks. 6 Moreover, according to (ii), having this feature only in particular subsets of H is still strong enough for excluding closed cycles. Therefore, the society induces a constitutionally stable network for sure if and only if the constitutions allow for a common ranking which is su¢ ciently restrictive. That is, there must be some consent about which feasible deviations are bene…cial and which are not.
Constitutional Rules and Players'Preferences
The remainder of this section is devoted to the analysis of requirements assuring the existence of a common ranking which excludes closed cycles. In order to get more intuition for this, let us consider a stylized example.
Example 3. Suppose there are three players N = fi 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 g and a unique connection M = fcg. Analogously to the example in the proof of Proposition 2 let
= ffi 1 g; fi 2 g; fi 3 gg, while the supporting coalitions are given by S c h l
where l 2 f3; 5; 7g and S c h 6
. Moreover, the players'preferences are supposed to be as follows:
: :
It is not di¢ cult to check that in this case the set H = fh 3 ; h 6 ; h 7 ; h 5 g forms a closed cycle because (h 3 ; h 6 ; h 7 ; h 5 ; h 3 ) is an improving path (see Figure 2 ). Inspecting this cycle in detail we can …nd a kind of irregularity in the constitutions: In h 3 , h 5 , and h 7 , player i 3 is the only one who may decide about deviations and she even has the power to exclude the other players from the connection. But after allowing i 2 to enter c and moving to h 6 , player i 3 looses her strong property rights and i 2 is able to grant i 1 access to the connection. Moreover, not only the constitutions exhibit a kind of irregularity but the players also disagree about the optimal form of the connection. First, as mentioned before, i 3 can exclude i 1 or i 2 in h 7 against their will. If either this exclusion was not possible or the players agreed to being excluded and did not want to join the connection again, the cycle would be splintered. Second, both players, i 2 and i 3 , have the power to support a deviation of player i 1 . The salient point is that both disagree about whether i 1 should be a member of the connection or not. If there was a common agreement about this, one of the deviations would be blocked. Figure 2 : The cycle H.
As the example illustrates, in general there are three main factors which support the occurrence of closed cycles:
(i) constitutions might change strongly even if the network itself does not change much,
(ii) players might be forced to leave a connection against their will, and (iii) there might be disagreement between the players who decide about the deviations.
In fact, for guaranteeing the existence of a common ranking which satis…es the criterion formalized in Proposition 3(ii), it is necessary to control for all these factors. This implies that we need to …nd reasonable restrictions on players'preferences and consistency conditions on the constitutions.
De…nition 6. Given a closed set H H, the constitutions C = (C c ) c2M satisfy regularity with respect to H if for all h 2 H and c 2 M we have:
protection against eviction with respect to H if for all h 2 H and c
decomposability with respect to H if for all h 2 H and c 2 M , we have that
The main motivation of regularity is to exclude the possibility of skipping back and forth between two networks the whole time: Condition (i) states that the feasible deviations and corresponding supporting coalitions of each c 2 M may not vary extremely whenever c changes. If further players are added to the connection, the feasible deviations are supposed to remain the same and supporting coalitions change only as long as they might be complemented by new members. Thus, together with (ii) this implies that if a coalition S 2 S c h (D) has the authority to support a deviation D 2 D c h , this cannot be reversed by another coalition which is neither associated to S nor to D.
If the constitutions satisfy protection against eviction, no player can be forced to leave a connection c 2 M if she does not want to do it. Modifying c always requires the consent of all deviating players (not only the consent of players who join the connection).
Decomposable constitutions exhibit a kind of independence property. If the deviation of a group of players is feasible, deviations of any subgroup of players are feasible as well and the corresponding supporting coalitions do not change.
De…nition 7.
A preference pro…le satis…es self-concern if h i h for all i 2 N and each pair of networks h; h 2 H
is uniform if for all i 2 N , c 2 M , and h; h 2 H with i 2 h(c) = h(c),
is equable if for all i 2 N , c 2 M , and h; h 2 H with i 2 h(c) = h(c),
is separable if for all i 2 N , c 2 M , and h; h 2 H with i 2 h(c) h(c) the two following conditions are satis…ed:
Self-concern is a kind of independence property. Player i neither bene…ts nor su¤ers if the network changes in such a way that i is not a¤ected directly.
The de…nition of lexicographic preferences is adapted from Dutta and Masso (1997) . Under this requirement, player i 2 N is mainly concerned about the connections themselves where she is a member of and less about who the other members are. Only if M h (i) = M h (i), might she care about the other players in her connections.
If the preferences of the players are uniform and a player leaves a connection, either all remaining members bene…t from this deviation or none of them. Note that this is supposed to be independent of the form the other connections have.
Under equability player i 2 N wants to stay in a connection c 2 M only if the other members also want to stay. Suppose, for example, the connections generate a payo¤ which is distributed equally among the members. Then, if a player has an incentive to leave c, the same goes for i.
Separability as introduced here is a variation of the same-named concept from Banerjee et al. (2001) . The idea is that player i's support for a certain leaving or joining group D is independent of the form the connection actually has.
Non-existence of (Closed) Cycles
Now, combining the restrictions introduced in the previous subsection allows formulating conditions which guarantee non-existence of (closed) cycles and the convergence to a constitutionally stable network.
Proposition 4. Let a society (N; M; ; C) be given where all constitutions satisfy protection against eviction with respect to a closed set H H. If the players' preferences satisfy equability and self-concern, there exist no cycles in H.
All proofs of this subsection are relegated to the appendix. The requirements of Proposition 4 re ‡ect the three factors identi…ed above which might cause instabilities. Equability and self-concern, for example, impose restrictions on the players' preferences. Both conditions together guarantee that there is only little disagreement about the optimal form of each connection c 2 M . Moreover, protection against eviction with respect to H has two consequences. On the one hand, as the de…nition directly implies, players cannot be forced to leave a connection if they do not agree to this. On the other hand, indirectly it also ensures that the constitutions do not change too strongly whenever a connection is altered. More speci…cally,
The interpretation is similar to regularity. If S has the power to support a deviation of D, this cannot be reversed by other supporting coalitions.
Proposition 5. Let a society (N; M; ; C) be given where all constitutions satisfy protection against eviction with respect to a closed set H H. If the players' preferences are lexicographic, there exist no cycles in H.
The intuition of the previous result is similar to the intuition of Proposition 4. Obviously, the only di¤erence is that the preferences are not supposed to satisfy equability and self-concern but here they are lexicographic. Therefore, even if there is some disagreement about the optimal form of the connections, it is relegated to a secondary role.
Both previous propositions exclude the existence of not only closed cycles but even of cycles in general. To some extent this is caused by protection against eviction. Indeed, it is not possible to drop or to relax this assumption without reinforcing the requirements on players'preferences.
Proposition 6. Let a society (N; M; ; C) be given. Assume all constitutions are decomposable and regular with respect to a closed set H H. Moreover, suppose the players'preferences are separable, uniform, equable and they satisfy self-concern. Then, there exist no closed cycles in H.
As the de…nition directly implies, regularity inhibits the constitutions from varying too extremely and, similar to Proposition 4, equability and self-concern guarantee a certain degree of consent about the optimal form of the network. In addition to this, due to separability and uniformity, in most situations the players are not forced to leave their connections if they do not agree to this. If, for example, some player's entry is supported by a certain coalition, the corresponding members will not change their minds, even if the connection is altered strongly. Thus, the player will only leave again if she has an incentive for deviating.
Note that similar to Proposition 4, it is required that the preferences satisfy equability and self-concern together. Consequently, and as before, it is possible to replace both assumptions in Proposition 6 by lexicography. The intuition is the same: The optimal form of the connections is relegated to a secondary role. 
Many-to-many Matching Markets
One of the most interesting features of our model is its versatile applicability since overlapping group structures appear in many environments. Consider, for example, many-to-many matching markets. The main primitives of these markets are two …nite sets of players E and F , where the members of E are usually interpreted as employees (or workers) and the members of F as …rms (see,e.g., Roth, 1984) . A (two-sided) many-to-many matching E F is then simply a collection of worker-…rm pairs indicating which employees are working for which …rms. Both sides of the market, i.e., all players in E as well as all players in F , are supposed to have preferences over all possible matchings. Thereby, the employees are classically assumed to care only about which …rms they work for but not about who their co-workers might be. The owners, on the other hand, are only concerned about the employees working for their …rm:
"This involves an assumption that workers are indi¤erent to who their co-workers might be, and …rms are indi¤erent to whether their employees moonlight at other jobs." (Roth, 1984 , P. 51)
Many-to-many matching markets can be embedded into our setting in a straightforward way. Let each c 2 M represent a …rm, i.e., M := F . Since in our model the
O \ h(c) = fo c g, the assumptions also imply h oc h whenever h(c) = h(c). For the
Therefore, the preferences of all employees are lexicographic; and restricted to the set H := fh 2 H j O \ h(c) = fo c g 8 c 2 M g the same holds for the owners, too. Since our model is richer than the classical matching approach (in particular, social networks as de…ned here might be interpreted as one-sided many-to-many matchings), it consequently enables us to model job markets in a more realistically. Complementing this, our formalization of constitutions allows us studying di¤erent levels of authority of the owners in a ‡exible way. For instance, in many countries (especially in Europe) employees are organized in labor unions representing the interests of their members. These unions may guarantee a quite strong protection against dismissal to the workers and, in the short run, the consent of a worker is needed if the owner wants her to leave the …rm. Many-to-many matching theory, however, usually concentrates on job markets without strong protection against dismissal like the US job market, for example, and neglects the impact of labor unions. Due to its versatility our model provides an appropriate framework for examining and comparing these di¤erent job markets in a convenient way. The remainder of this section is therefore devoted to studying the existence of constitutionally stable networks in three environments that di¤er in the level of authority that the owners could have.
Protection against Dismissal
In the following, we will always assume that the employees are allowed to accept as many jobs as they want to. Moreover, the …rms have unlimited capacity to hire workers, i.e., given O \ h(c)
First we consider the case where unions may guarantee a quite strong protection against dismissal to the workers and the owners do not have the authority to …re them. However, the owner is the only one who may decide about hiring new workers. But each employee is always free to terminate her job if she has an incentive to do it. These considerations lead to the following set of supporting coalitions:
Note that for the case of O \ h(c) 6 = fo c g, we assume that the empty set is the only supporting coalition and, thus, these networks are not stable by construction. Corollary 1. There are no cycles in "Protection against Dismissal".
Proof. This follows immediately from Proposition 5 because the players'preferences are lexicographic and we also have protection against dismissal with respect to the closed set H.
At …rst sight, the previous result might be slightly surprising because in many studies about two-sided many-to-many matchings the existence of stable matchings is an issue (e.g., Sotomayor, 2004) . This is mainly due to the fact that this literature examines environments where the owners are free to …re a worker if they bene…t from it. Indeed, protection against dismissal is the driving force of the previous result. Let ST PD denote the set of stable networks in Protection against Dismissal. Notice that this set contains the worker-optimal networks which are de…ned as follows.
M is a set of …rms which is mostly preferred by player i 2 E. Then, if h wo is given by h wo (c) = fi 2 E j c 2 M i g [ fo c g for all c 2 M , every employee is assigned to a set of …rms she preferably wants to work for and, thus, she obviously has no incentive for deviating.
Hire and Fire
Let us now focus on job markets without strong protection against dismissal. Translated to the model considered here, this means that the owners have the right to …re workers even if these do not agree to leaving. This aspect can be captured by considering the following supporting coalitions: (
ii) h + (c; D) i h if and only if h + (c; D)
i h for all ; 6 = D N n h(c).
As the name implies, strong separability is a stronger requirement than separability. Again, player i's support for a certain leaving or joining group is independent of the other members of the connection. But, under strong separability, this is also true if i belongs to the deviating group, i.e., if i leaves the connection. Translated to Hire and Fire, this basically means that i's preference about whether to work for a …rm c 2 M or not is independent of the other …rms she is working for. fig) . In particular, because her preferences are supposed to be strongly separable, she would also have a strict incentive for leaving connection c at h, but this contradicts the stability of this network.
Proposition 9 is in line with Roth (1984) . Under the requirement that the preferences of the owners and employees are substitutable, the author …nds a "con‡ict of interest between agents on opposite sides [of the market]" (Roth (1984) , p.47). A similar con ‡ict also arises here: Given (strong) separability of the players'preferences, the stable outcome which would be blocked …rst by the owners is the worker-optimal network. Indeed, this fact is completely independent of speci…c working conditions such as wages or the working environment, for example, because we abstract from factors like these. Moreover, as will be shown in the following, the con ‡ict becomes even stronger if the owners'level of authority is raised higher.
Slavery
Roughly speaking, "Slavery"is the counterposition of Protection against Dismissal. Here, the owners not only have the power to decide about new employees but also about whether workers may leave their …rm or not:
By applying Proposition 5 we get the following result:
Corollary 2. Every improving path in Slavery leads to a constitutionally stable network.
Let ST SL be the corresponding set of stable networks. But it might be the case that the intersection of the sets of stable networks is empty. However, according to Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 there exist no cycles in Protection against Dismissal and Slavery. Therefore, a simple algorithm for …nding stable networks in Hire and Fire (in case they exist) is to determine the sets of maximal elements of all improving paths in the two other settings and to check whether the intersection of these sets is non-empty.
Analogously to worker-optimal networks it is also possible to de…ne …rm-optimal networks. LetÊ Proof. Because Slavery is symmetric to Protection against Dismissal, the proof proceeds analogously to the one of Proposition 9, just by reversing the role of owners and employees.
Proposition 10 has two implications. First, it shows that the owners can enforce the network which is most bene…cial for them if they have a high level of authority. Second, this network would be the …rst network which is rejected by the employees. In fact, this result extends and reinforces the interpretation of Proposition 9 in a straightforward way: Each side of the market would be worse o¤ if the other side obtains more property rights. If, for example, labor unions narrow the owners'level of authority, the employees would bene…t from this and vice versa. Recall that this insight is independent of further working conditions (like wages), which we do not consider explicitly in our model. In particular, this implies that Roth's "polarization of interests"seems to achieve great generality.
Conclusion
Even though there is an immense and rich body of literature on the stability of networks (or group structures, respectively), in most of these studies, the stability concepts the authors use are relatively rigid since they do not consider explicitly the rules governing network formation. Indeed, the most distinctive feature of our framework is the formal introduction of constitutions which enable us modeling these rules in a very ‡exible way. Using this approach we …nd that enhancing the blocking power of the players does not necessarily lead to more stability. Moreover, we show that the society induces a constitutionally stable network if and only if there is a certain degree of consent between the players about which feasible deviations (according to the constitutions) are bene…cial and which are not. In this context, we also discuss conditions under which this criterion is satis…ed. By applying our model to job markets with labor unions we …nd a variation of Roth's "polarization of interests": The workers generically su¤er if the degree of authority of the owners is raised and vice versa. In addition to this, we also show that the markets always become stable if the property rights of one side of the market become su¢ ciently strong.
Although the model we analyze in this paper expands well-established branches like Network Theory or Matching Theory, for example, it is still subject to certain limitations which narrow the …eld of possible applications. For instance, assuming myopic behavior is reasonable for a start, but it is well-justi…ed only in complex settings where it is extremely di¢ cult to anticipate all possible deviations. Therefore, it might be worth analyzing which results could be obtained if players act farsight-edly. Another natural extension is to examine situations where it is possible to add new players or connections to the society. To incorporate this kind of dynamics, it would be necessary to relax the assumption of …xed sets of players and connections. Furthermore, under certain requirements, common rankings relate to ordinal potentials. Since there are numerous publications on potential functions (e.g., Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989; Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Page and Wooders, 2010; Qin, 1996; Slikker, 2001) , it seems interesting to study whether the corresponding results also extend to the model introduced here.
A Appendix: Proofs Proof of Proposition 3(i)
In order to show that existence of D implies the non-existence of cycles, we will consider the counterposition of this statement. Therefore, assume there is a cycle H H. Since there exists a path from each network in H to every other network in H, if D is a common ranking, we must have h D h as well as h D h for all h; h 2 H. Thus, there is no unique D-maximal element in H. Suppose there exists an l 2 f1; : : : ; kg with fh l 1 ; h l g = f h;hg. Because h l 0 6 = h;h for all l 0 = 2 fl 1; lg this yields
and, thus, there exists an improving path fromh to h or vice versa. This contradicts the assumption that the two networks are not comparable under D 1 . Therefore, there exists no l 2 f1; : : : ; kg with fh l 1 ; h l g = f h;hg. From this follows h 0 D 1 h 1 D 1 : : : D 1 h k which contradicts the assumption that there is no cycle. Thus, D 2 still represents the preferences of the players and by construction it is also transitive and strict. If it is not complete, the previous steps can be iterated. Because the set of networks is …nite, the iteration will stop after …nitely many steps and we obtain a common ranking D which is strict. In particular, strictness implies that for each H H there is a unique D-maximal networkĥ 2 H.
Proof of Proposition 3(ii)
The …rst direction proceeds analogously to the …rst direction of Part (i). Let a common ranking D and a set of networks H H be given. If H forms a closed cycle, we have I(h) = I(h 0 ) = H and h D h 0 as well as h 0 D h for all h; h 0 2 H. But this would contradict that there is a unique D-maximal network in H and, thus, there cannot exist a closed cycle. For the other direction suppose there exist no closed cycles. The …rst step of the construction of the common ranking proceeds in the same way as the one of Part (i). That is, we start with D 1 where h D 1 h if and only if there exists an improving path from h to h. But note that here this binary relation is not necessarily strict. Since by assumption there are no closed cycles, there exists at least one constitutionally stable network h 0 2 H. If this network is uniquely determined, according to Lemma 1 it is contained in every closed subset H H and D 1 can then obviously be extended to a complete ranking where h 0 is the unique maximal element. Therefore, in the following, suppose there exists a further constitutionally stable network h 00 2 H. and vice versa. We will show inductively that this is also satis…ed for all other k. Therefore, let k 3 and suppose that h 0 and h 00 are still not equivalent under D k 1 .
Moreover, assume this is not satis…ed under D k , i.e., we have h 0 D k h 00 as well as
This assumption will lead to a contradiction. Leth (k 1) ; h (k 1) 2 H be the corresponding pair of networks not comparable under D k 1 which is added in the next step. We will distinguish three cases:
Because we assume h 0 and h 00 are not equivalent under D k 1 , this implies that there exists a sequence of networks (h 1 ; : : : ; h l ) with h 1 = h 00 , h l = h 0 , and h 1 D k 1 : : : D k 1 h l . Moreover, from this also follows that there exists
which contradicts thath (k 1) and h (k 1) are not comparable under B k 1 .
This case proceeds analogously to the previous one by just reversing the roles of h 0 and h 00 .
Case 3: h 0 and h 00 are not comparable under D k 1 .
If h 0 and h 00 are equivalent under D k but not under D k 1 , there must be two sequences of networks (h 1 ; : : : ; h l ) and ( h 1 ; : : : ; h l ) with h 1 = h l = h 0 , h l = h 1 = h 00 , and
Moreover, there exist 1
In particular, this yields
which could only be satis…ed ifh (k 1) and h (k 1) are comparable under D k 1 .
Proof of Proposition 4
Let (h 0 ; : : : ; h k ) with h 0 ; : : : ; h k 2 H be an improving path. Moreover, suppose 
Because all players are self-concerned this implies
In other words, after joining the connection player i 0 has no incentive to leave it unilaterally. By equability this is true for all other
with D \ h 1 (c 0 ) 6 = ; and let i 2 D \ h 1 (c 0 ). Then:
Because the constitutions satisfy protection against eviction by assumption, no player can be forced to leave a connection against her will. Thus, all players in h 1 (c 0 ) \ D would block the deviation from h 1 to h 1 (c 0 ; D). We will show next that the same is also true in h 2 . To this end, let c 1 2 M and
. If c 1 = c 0 , the previous discussion implies D 1 \ h 1 (c 0 ) = ; and, by similar arguments as before, it can be shown that 
Similar to Case 1, exploiting that all players are self-concerned yields
Therefore, equability implies
Now, by advancing analog arguments as in Case 1 it is possible to show that this also yields
In particular, this is also true for h 0 = h k . But this contradicts again h 0 (c 0 ;
Proof of Proposition 5
Let (h 0 ; h 1 ; : : : ; h k ) be an improving path in H. We will show by induction that there is always at least one player i 2 N with M h k (i) 6 = M h 0 (i) and h k i h 0 . Thus,
According to the de…nition of an improving path and because all constitutions satisfy protection against eviction, at least one of the deviating players strictly bene…ts from moving to h 1 . Thus, there remains nothing to show.
k > 1: Suppose the statement is true for k 1.
be the subset of players with h k = h k 1 (c k 1 ; D k 1 ). First consider the case i 2 D k 1 . By assumption every player j 2 D k 1 strictly bene…ts from the deviation. Because preferences are lexicographic, this implies not only
But it might be possible that i su¤ers from this deviation, i.e., h k 1 i h k . Nevertheless, because
Some of the following proofs use similar technical arguments and the following lemma will serve as a convenient and useful tool. Recall that for each h 2 H, A be deleted from c until the connection is either empty or no coalition is supporting these deviations any more. This proceeding can be repeated for all connections and because N and M are …nite, after …nitely many steps an exit-proof network h will be reached.
Note that by applying the previous result, Lemma 1 could be restated as follows: There exists no closed cycle if and only if, for each exit-proof network h 2 H that is not constitutionally stable, there exists an improving path leading from h to a constitutionally stable network.
Proof of Proposition 6
The main idea of the proof is to construct for every network in H an improving path leading from this network to a stable network. By closedness, this stable network is in H, too. Hence, there cannot be a closed cycle in H.
For constructing these paths, let us de…ne, for each network h 2 H, the set
That is, a connection c 2 M is contained in M h if and only if at least one of its members does not want to leave c. In particular, if c 2 M h , due to equability, none of the members wants to leave c. Let h 1 2 H be an arbitrary network. By applying Lemma 2 we may assume that h 1 is exit-proof. In the following, we will establish that if h 1 is not constitutionally stable (if this would be the case, there would remain nothing to be shown), there exists an improving path from h 1 to another exit-proof network h 2 such that either
Then, if h 2 is not constitutionally stable, it is possible to iterate the previous step again and again. In particular, each time the step is iterated, either there are more connections whose members do not want to leave or the network strictly grows. Since both, the set of connections and the set of players, are supposed to be …nite, this procedure will end after …nitely many steps. 
In other words, after joining the connection, player i 1 has no incentive to leave it unilaterally. By equability this is also true for all i 2 h 
, this would violate equability and self-concern.
Therefore, the assumption cannot be true or, in other words, transforming c does not a¤ect the exit-proofness of c 0 . Similar considerations also apply if c 0 2 M n M h 1 with c 0 6 = c. However, it might be possible that c itself is not exit-proof any more. In this case, we can delete (analogously to Lemma 2) all groups of players from the connection under the conditions that (i) no player joins c and (ii) all deviations comply with the constitutions, i.e., they are feasible and supported by a supporting coalition. Let h 2 be the network which is …nally reached by means of this procedure. In particular, by advancing the same arguments as before it can be shown that the other connections are still exit-proof in h 2 and, moreover,
Case 2: A fig) by self-concern. Therefore, from equability it follows that no player in h 2 (c 1 ) wants to leave the connection unilaterally. Moreover, if
for all i 2 D \ h 2 (c 1 ), again by self-concern. In other words, all players who would have to leave the connection would su¤er from this deviation.
In the remainder of the proof we will show that h 2 is indeed exit-proof. Let c 0 2 M be an arbitrary connection and First consider the case c 1 6 = c 0 . Since the agents' preferences are separable,
same holds for h 2 , too. However, this is also true for all j 2 D 0 due to equability and self-concern. Hence, it follows that a coalition supports a deviation in h 2 if and only if it does the same in h 1 (cf. Case 1). In particular, this implies that the connection c 0 is also exit-proof in h 2 .
Next consider c 0 = c 1 . Here we have to distinguish two cases, S = ; and and, thus, 
. But this implies:
which obviously is a contradiction. Thus, the assumption D
must be false and c 1 is also exit-proof in h 2 .
Proof of Proposition 7
The proof proceeds in a similar way as the one of Proposition 6. As above we will construct for every exit-proof network h 1 2 H an improving path leading to a stable network.
Step 1: In this step we establish that if h 1 is not constitutionally stable, there exists an improving path to another exit-proof network h 2 such that there is since the constitutions are decomposable and the preferences are separable and lexicographic. But this would contradict minimality of D 1 . Therefore, given that each i 2 D 1 is supported by at least one player in S, from uniformity it follows that this also holds for all other members of h 1 (c 1 ) and, thus, strictly bene…t from this deviation. Note that it might be the case that there exists j 2 h(c 0 ) \ D who is worse o¤ after this change of the connection. However, because the preferences are lexicographic, this player still strictly prefers h (c; D \ S) to h 1 . By iterating these arguments all subsets of members where all players agree to deviate can be deleted from all connections. Let h 2 be the network which is …nally reached by means of this procedure. In particular, because of separability and uniformity, h 2 is exit-proof, too. Moreover, since no player has to leave a connection against her will and preferences are lexicographic, all players who deviated strictly prefer h 2 to h 1 .
Step 2: In this step we show that if h 2 is not stable, there exists (ii) a sequence of exit-proof networks h 1 ; h 2 ; h 3 ; : : : ; h k such that there is an improving path from h l 1 to h l for all 2 l k and the following two conditions are satis…ed: In particular, (a) implies h k 6 = h l 0 for all 1 l 0 < k. Therefore, since there are only …nitely many exit-proof networks, this sequence will stop after …nitely many steps and, thus, the last one has to be stable. We will show the existence of the sequence by means of induction. For k = 2 see Step 1. Consequently, let k 3 and assume there exist h 3 ; : : : ; h k and D 2 ; : : : ; D k 1 as de…ned above. Moreover, suppose h k is not stable. Since this network is exit-proof by assumption, there exists c k 2 M with A Step 2: We construct an improving path leading from h . By iterating the previous procedure, it is possible to reach an exit-proof network h 2 by deleting all workers from all connections they want to leave without impairing the other workers in E n B 1 . In particular, for all i 2 E n B 1 nothing changes and, therefore, they are indi¤erent between h 2 and h 1 . However, all i 2 B 1 strictly bene…t from the deviations and thus, they strictly prefer h 2 to h 1 .
Step 3: Iterating the procedure.
Once at h 2 , if A E n h 2 (c 2 ) with A c 2 h 2 +(c 2 ;B 2 ) = ; and to construct an improving path leading from h 2 + (c 2 ; B 2 ) to an exit-proof network h 3 . Analogously, h 2 will be Pareto dominated by h 3 from the workers'perspective. Because H is …nite, there exists only a …nite number of exit-proof networks. Hence, this procedure will end after …nitely many steps.
